1. the blind, de maurice maeterlinck, 1891, francês. (trad: maya slater, 1997.) 9dez15.
2. entre o mundo e eu, de ta-nehisi coates, 2015, inglês. (trad: paulo geiger, 2015.) 11dez15.
3. são joão marcos, patrimônio e progresso, de mv serra (org), 2011, português. 13dez15.
4. thinking, fast and slow, de daniel kahneman, 2011, inglês. 14dez15.
5a. fausto I, de johann wolfgang goethe, 1806, alemão. (trad: jenny klabin seagall, 1949.) 20dez15.
5b. fausto II, de johann wolfgang goethe, 1832, alemão. (trad: jenny klabin seagall, 1967.) 22dez15.
5c. faust, parts one and two, de johann wolfgang goethe, 1806-1832, alemão. (trad: george madison priest, 1932)
6. os monumentos do rio de janeiro – inventário 2015, de vera dias, 2015, português. 23dez15.
7a. decameron, de giovanni boccaccio, 1353, italiano. (trad: ivonne benedetti, 2013.) 29dez15-11jan16. releitura.
7b. decameron, dez novelas selecionadas, de giovanni boccaccio, 1353, italiano. (trad: mauricio santana dias, 2013.)
7c. decameron, vols I e II, de giovanni boccaccio, 1353, italiano. (trad: raul de polillo, 1952, atribuída a torrieri guimarães.)
7d. decameron, de giovanni boccaccio, 1353, italiano. (trad: g. h. mcwilliam, 1972.)
* * *
o que é ler um livro?
as perguntas que as pessoas me fazem sobre a lista de leituras sempre me surpreendem. elas revelam uma concepção de leitura que, embora não seja errada, é tão diferente da minha que às vezes nem sei o que dizer.
por exemplo, me perguntam qual é o critério para um livro entrar na lista de leituras. e eu respondo que não tenho muito critério, é uma coisa fluida e subjetiva: basta eu sentir que li o suficiente do livro para poder falar sobre ele em primeira mão com o mínimo de propriedade.
“aaaahhh, mas como você pode dizer que ‘leu um livro’ se não leu inteiro?”
e explico que não é uma competição, não tem juiz, não tem professor, não tem ninguém te vigiando, não vai cair no teste. se você falar que leu “os miseráveis“, ninguém vai dizer: “arrá, mas aquela parte chata sobre a história dos conventos aposto que você pulou! te peguei!”
além do mais, como ler um livro inteiro não prova literalmente nada e não traz mérito algum, não faz nenhuma diferença, nem pra você e pra ninguém, se você leu um livro inteiro ou pela metade: como ler um livro não é “mérito”, ler meio livro não é “meio mérito”.
às vezes, acho que as pessoas não conseguem ler porque projetam tanto valor, tanto peso, tanta complicação no simples ato da leitura que, realmente, acaba se tornando bem menos exaustivo ir jogar videogame.
não tenho nenhum problema com as pessoas cuja religião exige que leiam até o fim cada livro que começam, desde que não estendam essa obrigação obsessiva ao resto de nós.
eu leio os livros que eu quero, do jeito que eu quero, na hora que eu quero, por prazer, sem neuras.
* * *
o que me faz ler diferentes traduções do mesmo texto?
uma boa pergunta que me fizeram:
“por que ler diferentes traduções do mesmo texto?”
1) porque não sei ler a língua original;
vocês nunca, nunca vão me fazer fazendo isso com um texto escrito em inglês, espanhol ou português.
2) porque é possível, ou seja, porque EXISTEM múltiplas traduções;
a maioria dos textos nunca nem foi nem traduzido, quem dirá mais de uma vez.
3) mais importante, porque faz uma diferença significativa.
para a maioria dos textos de não-ficção, argumentativos, expositivos, etc, a diferença entre duas traduções não será muito significativa para a pessoa leitora não-especialista.
(exceções: quando a tradução é muito, muito inepta ou muito, muito antiga. por exemplo, uma tradução de heródoto feita em portugal no século 18 pode ser excelente mas difícil de ler para uma pessoa leitora brasileira de hoje.)
por outro lado, quando é um texto poético, antigo, literário, cheio de significado, etc, as diferenças entre as traduções podem ser realmente abissais, dependendo da filosofia, da época, da nacionalidade, do vocabulário, do talento poético, etc, de cada pessoa tradutora.
por exemplo, se li a ilíada traduzida por haroldo de campos e, depois, li a ilíada traduzida por alexander pope, dizer que “reli a ilíada” seria enganador, pois ambas as traduções são como se fossem duas obras poéticas diferentes, que compartilham somente o mesmo enredo.
seria como dizer que todas as pessoas são iguais porque compartilham um mesmo esqueleto.
* * *
as leituras de dezembro
the blind, de maurice maeterlinck
1891, francês. (trad: maya slater, 1997.) 9dez15.
maeterlink foi um escritor, poeta e dramatugo belga, que ganhou o nobel de literatura em 1911 e hoje está praticamente esquecido fora de sua terra natal.
essa peça, entretanto, é uma pequena joia de simplicidade e economia cênica, que deveria ser mais encenada.
estamos em uma floresta ancestral em uma ilha nórdica. no centro do palco, sentado numa pedra, um padre, claramente morto.
à sua volta, doze pessoas cegas, se perguntam: onde estará o padre?, já estamos esperando há horas, daqui a pouco escurece, precisamos voltar ao castelo, etc.
e é isso.
* * *
entre o mundo e eu, de ta-nehisi coates
2015, inglês. (trad: paulo geiger, 2015.) 11dez15.
li esse livro a convite da folha de são paulo, para escrever uma resenha.
a resenha foi publicada no dia 3 de janeiro de 2016.
a versão integral do texto, com todos os trechos que destaquei, está no meu site, aqui.
* * *
são joão marcos, patrimônio e progresso, de mv serra (org)
2011, português. 13dez15.
no século xix, a cidade de são joão marcos, na província do rio de janeiro, era uma das mais ricas do brasil, centro de uma vasta região cafeeira.
mais tarde, com o declínio do café e a abolição da escravatura, a cidade foi perdendo sua importância.
no começo do século xx, a construção de uma hidrelétrica próxima (a primeira do brasil, para abastecer de luz a capital federal, rio de janeiro) resultou em uma epidemia de malária que quase acabou com a cidade.
cada vez mais deserta, ela foi a primeira cidade brasileira a ser inteiramente tombada pelo recém-criado iphan.
no ano seguinte, ela foi a primeira cidade a ser inteiramente destombada: a capital federal continuava precisando de eletricidade e getúlio vargas decretou a construção de uma nova hidrelétrica. dessa vez, são joão marcos seria inundada.
são joão marcos foi evacuada e demolida a marretadas, casa por casa.
mas alguém errou as contas e a água da represa não chegou até cidade, ou melhor, até os destroços da cidade. ela não teria sido inundada, logo, não precisava ter sido abandonada.
a história, por alto, é mais ou menos essa.
o livro, publicado pela light, companhia de eletricidade do rio de janeiro e maior culpada pela destruição da cidade, tem como objetivo principal limpar a barra da empresa.
de um modo ou de outro, a história dessa cidade, empesteada, tombada, destombada, demolida, quase inundada, merece ser melhor conhecida.
* * *
thinking, fast and slow, de daniel kahneman
2011, inglês. 14dez15.
(existe tradução brasileira: “rápido e devagar, duas formas de pensar“, objetiva, 2012.)
mas já em novembro, só ao me informar sobre scarcity, já descobri outros dois que exploravam temas semelhantes que me interessam muito: strangers to ourselves: discovering the adaptive unconscious, de timothy d. wilson, que li em novembro e do qual falei mês passado, e esse thinking, fast and slow, de daniel kahneman, que li agora em dezembro.
* * *
daniel kahneman divide nossa mente em dois sistemas: o sistema 1 funciona o tempo todo, no automático, e seria responsável por nossos instintos, intuições, preconceitos; o sistema 2, só acionado quando necessário, seria responsável por nossas operações mentais mais elaboradas, como reflexão, cálculo, etc.
afinal, o quão livres somos para tomar as decisões que achamos que são livres?
sublinhei muita coisa. preferi não excluir nada. o tema me fascina. as pessoas não-interessadas já podem pular para o próximo livro.
* * *
nós julgamos de acordo com o nosso sistema 2. as pessoas à nossa volta, entretanto, nos julgam de acordo com as reações automáticas do nossos sistema 1.
por isso, muitas vezes, existe uma abismo entre nossa autoimagem e a imagem que transmitimos.
pior: quase sempre, as outras pessoas estão certas e nós, erradas.
“Questioning what we believe and want is difficult at the best of times, and especially difficult when we most need to do it, but we can benefit from the informed opinions of others. Many of us spontaneously anticipate how friends and colleagues will evaluate our choices; the quality and content of these anticipated judgments therefore matters. The expectation of intelligent gossip is a powerful motive for serious self-criticism, more powerful than New Year resolutions to improve one’s decision making at work and at home.”
* * *
somos todas excessivamente autoconfiantes e otimistas, mesmo quem diz que não é:
The difficulties of statistical thinking contribute to the main theme of Part 3, which describes a puzzling limitation of our mind: our excessive confidence in what we believe we know, and our apparent inability to acknowledge the full extent of our ignorance and the uncertainty of the world we live in. We are prone to overestimate how much we understand about the world and to underestimate the role of chance in events. Overconfidence is fed by the illusory certainty of hindsight. My views on this topic have been influenced by Nassim Taleb, the author of The Black Swan. I hope for watercooler conversations that intelligently explore the lessons that can be learned from the past while resisting the lure of hindsight and the illusion of certainty. …
[M]any people are overconfident, prone to place too much faith in their intuitions. They apparently find cognitive effort at least mildly unpleasant and avoid it as much as possible.
* * *
sobre o experimento do gorila:
The gorilla study illustrates two important facts about our minds: we can be blind to the obvious, and we are also blind to our blindness.
* * *
sobre o experimento das linhas de mesmo tamanho:
[Y]ou cannot decide to see the lines as equal, although you know they are.
* * *
a premissa do livro: é mais fácil ver os erros dos outros do que os nossos.
Constantly questioning our own thinking would be impossibly tedious, and System 2 is much too slow and inefficient to serve as a substitute for System 1 in making routine decisions. The best we can do is a compromise: learn to recognize situations in which mistakes are likely and try harder to avoid significant mistakes when the stakes are high. The premise of this book is that it is easier to recognize other people’s mistakes than our own.
* * *
eu tomo glifage para abaixar o meu açúcar de sangue. de acordo com alguns estudos, talvez eu devesse estar fazendo as palavras cruzadas:
The most surprising discovery made by Baumeister’s group shows, as he puts it, that the idea of mental energy is more than a mere metaphor. The nervous system consumes more glucose than most other parts of the body, and effortful mental activity appears to be especially expensive in the currency of glucose. When you are actively involved in difficult cognitive reasoning or engaged in a task that requires self-control, your blood glucose level drops. The effect is analogous to a runner who draws down glucose stored in her muscles during a sprint. The bold implication of this idea is that the effects of ego depletion could be undone by ingesting glucose, and Baumeister and his colleagues have confirmed this hypothesis in several experiments.
* * *
tudo afeta nossas decisões: quando estão com fome ou cansados, juízes são mais severos do que quando bem dispostos e bem alimentados:
[T]ired and hungry judges tend to fall back on the easier default position of denying requests for parole.
* * *
agir de maneira calma acalma:
You can see why the common admonition to “act calm and kind regardless of how you feel” is very good advice: you are likely to be rewarded by actually feeling calm and kind.
* * *
sobre esse experimento:
[T]he users of the kitchen contributed almost three times as much in “eye weeks” as they did in “flower weeks.”
* * *
criatividade: memória associativa que funciona excepcionalmente bem:
[C]reativity is associative memory that works exceptionally well.
* * *
a intuição é associada ao nosso humor. quando estamos felizes, pensamos menos e somos mais intuitivas.
[W]hen we are uncomfortable and unhappy, we lose touch with our intuition. … These findings add to the growing evidence that good mood, intuition, creativity, gullibility, and increased reliance on System 1 form a cluster. At the other pole, sadness, vigilance, suspicion, an analytic approach, and increased effort also go together. A happy mood loosens the control of System 2 over performance: when in a good mood, people become more intuitive and more creative but also less vigilant and more prone to logical errors.
* * *
um ser humano, um bicho que vê causalidade em tudo:
A story in Nassim Taleb’s The Black Swan illustrates this automatic search for causality. He reports that bond prices initially rose on the day of Saddam Hussein’s capture in his hiding place in Iraq. Investors were apparently seeking safer assets that morning, and the Bloomberg News service flashed this headline: U.S. TREASURIES RISE; HUSSEIN CAPTURE MAY NOT CURB TERRORISM. Half an hour later, bond prices fell back and the revised headline read: U.S. TREASURIES FALL; HUSSEIN CAPTURE BOOSTS ALLURE OF RISKY ASSETS. Obviously, Hussein’s capture was the major event of the day, and because of the way the automatic search for causes shapes our thinking, that event was destined to be the explanation of whatever happened in the market on that day. The two headlines look superficially like explanations of what happened in the market, but a statement that can explain two contradictory outcomes explains nothing at all. In fact, all the headlines do is satisfy our need for coherence: a large event is supposed to have consequences, and consequences need causes to explain them.
graças a essa citação, li esse livro em janeiro. mês que vem, comento. tem uma tradução em português: a lógica do cisne negro, ed. best seller, 2008.
* * *
nossa intuição escolhe entre alternativas que nem sabíamos que tínhamos:
The most important aspect of both examples is that a definite choice was made, but you did not know it. Only one interpretation came to mind, and you were never aware of the ambiguity. System 1 does not keep track of alternatives that it rejects, or even of the fact that there were alternatives. Conscious doubt is not in the repertoire of System 1; it requires maintaining incompatible interpretations in mind at the same time, which demands mental effort. Uncertainty and doubt are the domain of System 2.
* * *
Gilbert proposed that understanding a statement must begin with an attempt to believe it: you must first know what the idea would mean if it were true. Only then can you decide whether or not to unbelieve it. The initial attempt to believe is an automatic operation of System 1, which involves the construction of the best possible interpretation of the situation. … [W]hen System 2 is otherwise engaged, we will believe almost anything. System 1 is gullible and biased to believe, System 2 is in charge of doubting and unbelieving, but System 2 is sometimes busy, and often lazy.
* * *
porque publicidade funciona melhor à noite:
[P]eople are more likely to be influenced by empty persuasive messages, such as commercials, when they are tired and depleted.
* * *
abrir a discussão não é a melhor maneira de garantir que todos falem:
The standard practice of open discussion gives too much weight to the opinions of those who speak early and assertively, causing others to line up behind them.
* * *
quando menos sabemos, mais certeza temos:
[K]nowing little makes it easier to fit everything you know into a coherent pattern.
* * *
na falta de respostas para as perguntas que temos, encontramos respostas para outras perguntas e achamos que estamos respondendo à primeira pergunta:
The normal state of your mind is that you have intuitive feelings and opinions about almost everything that comes your way. … If a satisfactory answer to a hard question is not found quickly, System 1 will find a related question that is easier and will answer it. I call the operation of answering one question in place of another substitution. I also adopt the following terms: The target question is the assessment you intend to produce. The heuristic question is the simpler question that you answer instead. … [W]hen called upon to judge probability, people actually judge something else and believe they have judged probability. … “Do we still remember the question we are trying to answer? Or have we substituted an easier one?” “The question we face is whether this candidate can succeed. The question we seem to answer is whether she interviews well. Let’s not substitute.”
* * *
a lei dos pequenos números:
Small samples yield extreme results more often than large samples do. … The law of small numbers is a manifestation of a general bias that favors certainty over doubt, which will turn up in many guises in following chapters. … The strong bias toward believing that small samples closely resemble the population from which they are drawn is also part of a larger story: we are prone to exaggerate the consistency and coherence of what we see. … Because the events are independent and because the outcomes B and G are (approximately) equally likely, then any possible sequence of six births is as likely as any other. … A careful statistical analysis revealed that the distribution of hits was typical of a random process—and typical as well in evoking a strong impression that it was not random. “To the untrained eye,” Feller remarks, “randomness appears as regularity or tendency to cluster.” … The exaggerated faith in small samples is only one example of a more general illusion—we pay more attention to the content of messages than to information about their reliability, and as a result end up with a view of the world around us that is simpler and more coherent than the data justify. Jumping to conclusions is a safer sport in the world of our imagination than it is in reality.
* * *
explicações causais de eventos aleatórios estão inevitavelmente erradas:
Statistics produce many observations that appear to beg for causal explanations but do not lend themselves to such explanations. Many facts of the world are due to chance, including accidents of sampling. Causal explanations of chance events are inevitably wrong.
* * *
sobre o efeito âncora:
Any number that you are asked to consider as a possible solution to an estimation problem will induce an anchoring effect. … [Y]ou should assume that any number that is on the table has had an anchoring effect on you, and if the stakes are high you should mobilize yourself (your System 2) to combat the effect.
* * *
sobre a heurística de disponibilidade:
One of our projects was the study of what we called the availability heuristic. We thought of that heuristic when we asked ourselves what people actually do when they wish to estimate the frequency of a category, such as “people who divorce after the age of 60” or “dangerous plants.” The answer was straightforward: instances of the class will be retrieved from memory, and if retrieval is easy and fluent, the category will be judged to be large. We defined the availability heuristic as the process of judging frequency by “the ease with which instances come to mind.” … “Could it be that I feel no need to get a flu shot because none of my acquaintances got the flu last year?” Maintaining one’s vigilance against biases is a chore—but the chance to avoid a costly mistake is sometimes worth the effort. … Self-ratings were dominated by the ease with which examples had come to mind. The experience of fluent retrieval of instances trumped the number retrieved.
* * *
como nossas escolhas podem ser manipuladas pela escolha de métricas:
His work offers a picture of Mr. and Ms. Citizen that is far from flattering: guided by emotion rather than by reason, easily swayed by trivial details, and inadequately sensitive to differences between low and negligibly low probabilities. … Slovic lists nine ways of defining the mortality risk associated with the release of a toxic material into the air, ranging from “death per million people” to “death per million dollars of product produced.” His point is that the evaluation of the risk depends on the choice of a measure—with the obvious possibility that the choice may have been guided by a preference for one outcome or another. He goes on to conclude that “defining risk is thus an exercise in power.” You might not have guessed that one can get to such thorny policy issues from experimental studies of the psychology of judgment!
* * *
a falácia de conjunção (já falei sobre esse exemplo aqui):
“Think in terms of Venn diagrams. The set of feminist bank tellers is wholly included in the set of bank tellers, as every feminist bank teller is a bank teller. Therefore the probability that Linda is a feminist bank teller must be lower than the probability of her being a bank teller. When you specify a possible event in greater detail you can only lower its probability. The problem therefore sets up a conflict between the intuition of representativeness and the logic of probability. …
Amos and I introduced the idea of a conjunction fallacy, which people commit when they judge a conjunction of two events (here, bank teller and feminist) to be more probable than one of the events (bank teller) in a direct comparison. … The most representative outcomes combine with the personality description to produce the most coherent stories. The most coherent stories are not necessarily the most probable, but they are plausible, and the notions of coherence, plausibility, and probability are easily confused by the unwary. …
To appreciate the role of plausibility, consider the following questions: Which alternative is more probable? Mark has hair. Mark has blond hair. and Which alternative is more probable? Jane is a teacher. Jane is a teacher and walks to work. The two questions have the same logical structure as the Linda problem, but they cause no fallacy, because the more detailed outcome is only more detailed—it is not more plausible, or more coherent, or a better story. The evaluation of plausibility and coherence does not suggest and answer to the probability question. In the absence of a competing intuition, logic prevails.
* * *
um experimento interessantíssimo que demonstra como não aprendemos nada de experimentos científicos:
So far as the participants knew, one of them was having a seizure and had asked for help. However, there were several other people who could possibly respond, so perhaps one could stay safely in one’s booth. These were the results: only four of the fifteen participants responded immediately to the appeal for help. Six never got out of their booth, and five others came out only well after the “seizure victim” apparently choked. The experiment shows that individuals feel relieved of responsibility when they know that others have heard the same request for help. …
The comparison of the predictions of the two groups provides an answer to a significant question: Did students learn from the results of the helping experiment anything that significantly changed their way of thinking? The answer is straightforward: they learned nothing at all. Their predictions about the two individuals were indistinguishable from the predictions made by students who had not been exposed to the statistical results of the experiment. They knew the base rate in the group from which the individuals had been drawn, but they remained convinced that the people they saw on the video had been quick to help the stricken stranger. … [S]tudents “quietly exempt themselves” (and their friends and acquaintances) from the conclusions of experiments that surprise them. …
Nisbett and Borgida found that when they presented their students with a surprising statistical fact, the students managed to learn nothing at all. But when the students were surprised by individual cases—two nice people who had not helped—they immediately made the generalization and inferred that helping is more difficult than they had thought. Nisbett and Borgida summarize the results in a memorable sentence: Subjects’ unwillingness to deduce the particular from the general was matched only by their willingness to infer the general from the particular. …
The test of learning psychology is whether your understanding of situations you encounter has changed, not whether you have learned a new fact. …
There is a deep gap between our thinking about statistics and our thinking about individual cases. Statistical results with a causal interpretation have a stronger effect on our thinking than noncausal information. But even compelling causal statistics will not change long-held beliefs or beliefs rooted in personal experience. On the other hand, surprising individual cases have a powerful impact and are a more effective tool for teaching psychology because the incongruity must be resolved and embedded in a causal story.
* * *
regressão à média, outro fenômeno interessantíssimo:
What he had observed is known as regression to the mean, which in that case was due to random fluctuations in the quality of performance. Naturally, he praised only a cadet whose performance was far better than average. But the cadet was probably just lucky on that particular attempt and therefore likely to deteriorate regardless of whether or not he was praised. Similarly, the instructor would shout into a cadet’s earphones only when the cadet’s performance was unusually bad and therefore likely to improve regardless of what the instructor did. The instructor had attached a causal interpretation to the inevitable fluctuations of a random process. …
Highly intelligent women tend to marry men who are less intelligent than they are. You can get a good conversation started at a party by asking for an explanation, and your friends will readily oblige. Even people who have had some exposure to statistics will spontaneously interpret the statement in causal terms. Some may think of highly intelligent women wanting to avoid the competition of equally intelligent men, or being forced to compromise in their choice of spouse because intelligent men do not want to compete with intelligent women. More far-fetched explanations will come up at a good party. Now consider this statement: The correlation between the intelligence scores of spouses is less than perfect. This statement is obviously true and not interesting at all. Who would expect the correlation to be perfect? There is nothing to explain. But the statement you found interesting and the statement you found trivial are algebraically equivalent. If the correlation between the intelligence of spouses is less than perfect (and if men and women on average do not differ in intelligence), then it is a mathematical inevitability that highly intelligent women will be married to husbands who are on average less intelligent than they are (and vice versa, of course). The observed regression to the mean cannot be more interesting or more explainable than the imperfect correlation. …
[O]ur mind is strongly biased toward causal explanations and does not deal well with “mere statistics.” …
[W]e pay people quite well to provide interesting explanations of regression effects. A business commentator who correctly announces that “the business did better this year because it had done poorly last year” is likely to have a short tenure on the air. …
Depressed children treated with an energy drink improve significantly over a three-month period. I made up this newspaper headline, but the fact it reports is true: if you treated a group of depressed children for some time with an energy drink, they would show a clinically significant improvement. It is also the case that depressed children who spend some time standing on their head or hug a cat for twenty minutes a day will also show improvement. Most readers of such headlines will automatically infer that the energy drink or the cat hugging caused an improvement, but this conclusion is completely unjustified. Depressed children are an extreme group, they are more depressed than most other children—and extreme groups regress to the mean over time. The correlation between depression scores on successive occasions of testing is less than perfect, so there will be regression to the mean: depressed children will get somewhat better over time even if they hug no cats and drink no Red Bull. In order to conclude that an energy drink—or any other treatment—is effective, you must compare a group of patients who receive this treatment to a “control group” that receives no treatment (or, better, receives a placebo). The control group is expected to improve by regression alone, and the aim of the experiment is to determine whether the treated patients improve more than regression can explain. …
[T]he prediction of the future is not distinguished from an evaluation of current evidence—prediction matches evaluation. This is perhaps the best evidence we have for the role of substitution. People are asked for a prediction but they substitute an evaluation of the evidence, without noticing that the question they answer is not the one they were asked. This process is guaranteed to generate predictions that are systematically biased; they completely ignore regression to the mean. …
Intuitive predictions need to be corrected because they are not regressive and therefore are biased.
* * *
construímos a melhor narrativa possível com os fatos que temos:
You cannot help dealing with the limited information you have as if it were all there is to know. You build the best possible story from the information available to you, and if it is a good story, you believe it. Paradoxically, it is easier to construct a coherent story when you know little, when there are fewer pieces to fit into the puzzle. Our comforting conviction that the world makes sense rests on a secure foundation: our almost unlimited ability to ignore our ignorance.
* * *
o que significa “saber” algo?
I have heard of too many people who “knew well before it happened that the 2008 financial crisis was inevitable.” This sentence contains a highly objectionable word, which should be removed from our vocabulary in discussions of major events. The word is, of course, knew. Some people thought well in advance that there would be a crisis, but they did not know it. They now say they knew it because the crisis did in fact happen. This is a misuse of an important concept. In everyday language, we apply the word know only when what was known is true and can be shown to be true. We can know something only if it is both true and knowable. But the people who thought there would be a crisis (and there are fewer of them than now remember thinking it) could not conclusively show it at the time. Many intelligent and well-informed people were keenly interested in the future of the economy and did not believe a catastrophe was imminent; I infer from this fact that the crisis was not knowable. What is perverse about the use of know in this context is not that some individuals get credit for prescience that they do not deserve. It is that the language implies that the world is more knowable than it is. It helps perpetuate a pernicious illusion. …
The core of the illusion is that we believe we understand the past, which implies that the future also should be knowable, but in fact we understand the past less than we believe we do. Know is not the only word that fosters this illusion. In common usage, the words intuition and premonition also are reserved for past thoughts that turned out to be true. The statement “I had a premonition that the marriage would not last, but I was wrong” sounds odd, as does any sentence about an intuition that turned out to be false. To think clearly about the future, we need to clean up the language that we use in labeling the beliefs we had in the past. …
Your inability to reconstruct past beliefs will inevitably cause you to underestimate the extent to which you were surprised by past events.
* * *
o efeito halo:
Indeed, the halo effect is so powerful that you probably find yourself resisting the idea that the same person and the same behaviors appear methodical when things are going well and rigid when things are going poorly. Because of the halo effect, we get the causal relationship backward: we are prone to believe that the firm fails because its CEO is rigid, when the truth is that the CEO appears to be rigid because the firm is failing. This is how illusions of understanding are born. …
You are probably tempted to think of causal explanations for these observations: perhaps the successful firms became complacent, the less successful firms tried harder. But this is the wrong way to think about what happened. The average gap must shrink, because the original gap was due in good part to luck, which contributed both to the success of the top firms and to the lagging performance of the rest. We have already encountered this statistical fact of life: regression to the mean.
* * *
o que nos faz ter certeza? a certeza é um sentimento, não uma conclusão lógica (esse aliás é o tema de outro livro que li na sequência, “on being certain”, do qual falarei mês que vem):
For some of our most important beliefs we have no evidence at all, except that people we love and trust hold these beliefs. Considering how little we know, the confidence we have in our beliefs is preposterous—and it is also essential. … Subjective confidence in a judgment is not a reasoned evaluation of the probability that this judgment is correct. Confidence is a feeling, which reflects the coherence of the information and the cognitive ease of processing it. It is wise to take admissions of uncertainty seriously, but declarations of high confidence mainly tell you that an individual has constructed a coherent story in his mind, not necessarily that the story is true.
* * *
porque os experts são ruins na sua área de expertise? uma análise do mercado financeiro:
Many individual investors lose consistently by trading, an achievement that a dart-throwing chimp could not match. …
“When you sell a stock,” I asked, “who buys it?” He answered with a wave in the vague direction of the window, indicating that he expected the buyer to be someone else very much like him. That was odd: What made one person buy and the other sell? What did the sellers think they knew that the buyers did not? …
In a paper titled “Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth,” they showed that, on average, the most active traders had the poorest results, while the investors who traded the least earned the highest returns. In another paper, titled “Boys Will Be Boys,” they showed that men acted on their useless ideas significantly more often than women, and that as a result women achieved better investment results than men. …
The consistent correlations that would indicate differences in skill were not to be found. The results resembled what you would expect from a dice-rolling contest, not a game of skill. … Our message to the executives was that, at least when it came to building portfolios, the firm was rewarding luck as if it were skill. …
The main point of this chapter is not that people who attempt to predict the future make many errors; that goes without saying. The first lesson is that errors of prediction are inevitable because the world is unpredictable. The second is that high subjective confidence is not to be trusted as an indicator of accuracy (low confidence could be more informative).
* * *
já que os experts não conseguem prever nada, devemos substituí-los por algoritmos?
About 60% of the studies have shown significantly better accuracy for the algorithms. The other comparisons scored a draw in accuracy, but a tie is tantamount to a win for the statistical rules, which are normally much less expensive to use than expert judgment. No exception has been convincingly documented. …
Why are experts inferior to algorithms? One reason, which Meehl suspected, is that experts try to be clever, think outside the box, and consider complex combinations of features in making their predictions. Complexity may work in the odd case, but more often than not it reduces validity. Simple combinations of features are better. Several studies have shown that human decision makers are inferior to a prediction formula even when they are given the score suggested by the formula! They feel that they can overrule the formula because they have additional information about the case, but they are wrong more often than not.
* * *
intuição nada mais é do que reconhecimento:
“The situation has provided a cue; this cue has given the expert access to information stored in memory, and the information provides the answer. Intuition is nothing more and nothing less than recognition.”
* * *
a confiança de uma pessoa em sua intuição não tem nada a ver com a validade dessa intuição:
A mind that follows WYSIATI will achieve high confidence much too easily by ignoring what it does not know. It is therefore not surprising that many of us are prone to have high confidence in unfounded intuitions. Klein and I eventually agreed on an important principle: the confidence that people have in their intuitions is not a reliable guide to their validity.
* * *
o problema não é os experts não conseguirem prever o futuro, mas sim o fato de venderem para nós (muitas vezes, bem caro) sua capacidade de realizar o impossível. não dá pra confiar em intuições sobre sistemas instáveis:
It is wrong to blame anyone for failing to forecast accurately in an unpredictable world. However, it seems fair to blame professionals for believing they can succeed in an impossible task. Claims for correct intuitions in an unpredictable situation are self-delusional at best, sometimes worse. In the absence of valid cues, intuitive “hits” are due either to luck or to lies. If you find this conclusion surprising, you still have a lingering belief that intuition is magic. Remember this rule: intuition cannot be trusted in the absence of stable regularities in the environment. …
An experienced psychotherapist knows that she is skilled in working out what is going on in her patient’s mind and that she has good intuitions about what the patient will say next. It is tempting for her to conclude that she can also anticipate how well the patient will do next year, but this conclusion is not equally justified. Short-term anticipation and long-term forecasting are different tasks, and the therapist has had adequate opportunity to learn one but not the other.
* * *
sobre a falácia do planejamento:
This embarrassing episode remains one of the most instructive experiences of my professional life. I eventually learned three lessons from it. The first was immediately apparent: I had stumbled onto a distinction between two profoundly different approaches to forecasting, which Amos and I later labeled the inside view and the outside view. The second lesson was that our initial forecasts of about two years for the completion of the project exhibited a planning fallacy. Our estimates were closer to a best-case scenario than to a realistic assessment. I was slower to accept the third lesson, which I call irrational perseverance: the folly we displayed that day in failing to abandon the project. Facing a choice, we gave up rationality rather than give up the enterprise. … There was no further attempt at rational planning for the rest of the time I spent as a member of the team—a particularly troubling omission for a team dedicated to teaching rationality. …
Amos and I coined the term planning fallacy to describe plans and forecasts that are unrealistically close to best-case scenarios could be improved by consulting the statistics of similar cases.
* * *
o mundo é mais cruel e incerto do que pensamos, e somos mais otimistas do que deveríamos ser:
[P]eople often (but not always) take on risky projects because they are overly optimistic about the odds they face. I will return to this idea several times in this book—it probably contributes to an explanation of why people litigate, why they start wars, and why they open small businesses. …
Most of us view the world as more benign than it really is, our own attributes as more favorable than they truly are, and the goals we adopt as more achievable than they are likely to be. We also tend to exaggerate our ability to forecast the future, which fosters optimistic overconfidence. …
As Nassim Taleb has argued, inadequate appreciation of the uncertainty of the environment inevitably leads economic agents to take risks they should avoid. …
Can overconfident optimism be overcome by training? I am not optimistic.
* * *
uma ferramenta para vencer a falácia de planejamento: o pré-mortem.
He labels his proposal the premortem. The procedure is simple: when the organization has almost come to an important decision but has not formally committed itself, Klein proposes gathering for a brief session a group of individuals who are knowledgeable about the decision. The premise of the session is a short speech: “Imagine that we are a year into the future. We implemented the plan as it now exists. The outcome was a disaster. Please take 5 to 10 minutes to write a brief history of that disaster.” …
The premortem has two main advantages: it overcomes the groupthink that affects many teams once a decision appears to have been made, and it unleashes the imagination of knowledgeable individuals in a much-needed direction. …
The suppression of doubt contributes to overconfidence in a group where only supporters of the decision have a voice. The main virtue of the premortem is that it legitimizes doubts. Furthermore, it encourages even supporters of the decision to search for possible threats that they had not considered earlier.
* * *
duas espécies diferentes: econs & humans.
To a psychologist, it is self-evident that people are neither fully rational nor completely selfish, and that their tastes are anything but stable. Our two disciplines seemed to be studying different species, which the behavioral economist Richard Thaler later dubbed Econs and Humans.
* * *
como medir a utilidade (ou seja, a satisfação):
His utility function explained why poor people buy insurance and why richer people sell it to them. As you can see in the table, the loss of 1 million causes a loss of 4 points of utility (from 100 to 96) to someone who has 10 million and a much larger loss of 18 points (from 48 to 30) to someone who starts off with 3 million. The poorer man will happily pay a premium to transfer the risk to the richer one, which is what insurance is about. …
The happiness that Jack and Jill experience is determined by the recent change in their wealth, relative to the different states of wealth that define their reference points (1 million for Jack, 9 million for Jill).
* * *
As the psychologist Daniel Gilbert observed, disbelieving is hard work, and System 2 is easily tired.
* * *
“uma única barata estraga um pote de caramelos. um caramelo não tem nenhum efeito sobre um pote de baratas.”
paul rozin, explicando prospect theory, ou porque prestamos mais atenção no ruim do que no bom.
(eu adoooooro a imagem do pote de baratas.)
The fundamental ideas of prospect theory are that reference points exist, and that losses loom larger than corresponding gains. …
The psychologist Paul Rozin, an expert on disgust, observed that a single cockroach will completely wreck the appeal of a bowl of cherries, but a cherry will do nothing at all for a bowl of cockroaches. …
When you pay attention to a threat, you worry—and the decision weights reflect how much you worry. Because of the possibility effect, the worry is not proportional to the probability of the threat. Reducing or mitigating the risk is not adequate; to eliminate the worry the probability must be brought down to zero. …
When you take the long view of many similar decisions, you can see that paying a premium to avoid a small risk of a large loss is costly. … Consistent overweighting of improbable outcomes—a feature of intuitive decision making—eventually leads to inferior outcomes.
* * *
a mera possibilidade do acontecimento ruim já impacta o nosso emocional e faz com que façamos besteira. os investidores que mais vigiam seus investimentos são os mais estressados e os que menos ganham, pois a cada pequeno movimento ruim, já querem “fazer alguma coisa”:
The original formulation of prospect theory included the argument that “highly unlikely events are either ignored or overweighted,” but The evidence suggests the hypothesis that focal attention and salience contribute to both the overestimation of unlikely events and the overweighting of unlikely outcomes. Salience is enhanced by mere mention of an event, by its vividness, and by the format in which probability is described. …
The combination of loss aversion and narrow framing is a costly curse. Individual investors can avoid that curse, achieving the emotional benefits of broad framing while also saving time and agony, by reducing the frequency with which they check how well their investments are doing. Closely following daily fluctuations is a losing proposition, because the pain of the frequent small losses exceeds the pleasure of the equally frequent small gains. Once a quarter is enough, and may be more than enough for individual investors. In addition to improving the emotional quality of life, the deliberate avoidance of exposure to short-term outcomes improves the quality of both decisions and outcomes.
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a gente tende a errar em prol do default, porque errar contra o default tem um peso psíquico e social muito maior.
(tipo, se você está numa relação monogâmica e se divorcia, bem, paciência. se a relação fosse não-monogâmica… “quem mandou inventar moda?! todo mundo sabe que isso não funciona!” etc etc.)
The key is not the difference between commission and omission but the distinction between default options and actions that deviate from the default. When you deviate from the default, you can easily imagine the norm—and if the default is associated with bad consequences, the discrepancy between the two can be the source of painful emotions. …
The asymmetry in the risk of regret favors conventional and risk-averse choices. The bias appears in many contexts. Consumers who are reminded that they may feel regret as a result of their choices show an increased preference for conventional options, favoring brand names over generics.
* * *
querer proteger os filhos de todos os riscos é impossível e caro:
Anyone can understand and sympathize with the reluctance of parents to trade even a minute increase of risk to their child for money. It is worth noting, however, that this attitude is incoherent and potentially damaging to the safety of those we wish to protect. Even the most loving parents have finite resources of time and money to protect their child (the keeping-my-child-safe mental account has a limited budget), and it seems reasonable to deploy these resources in a way that puts them to best use. Money that could be saved by accepting a minute increase in the risk of harm from a pesticide could certainly be put to better use in reducing the child’s exposure to other harms, perhaps by purchasing a safer car seat or covers for electric sockets. The taboo tradeoff against accepting any increase in risk is not an efficient way to use the safety budget. In fact, the resistance may be motivated by a selfish fear of regret more than by a wish to optimize the child’s safety.
* * *
as contradições entre o eu-que-está-vivendo e o eu-que-lembra.
será que nossa memória vale de alguma coisa? ao lembrar uma situação ruim, o eu-que-lembra registra mais o pico de ruindade e o final; já o eu-que-está-vivendo sofreu durante toda a experiência.
as distorções do eu-que-lembra faz com que esqueçamos a dor que passou o eu-que-está-vivendo e escolhamos passar de novo por experiências traumáticas.
(em outras palavras, é a razão pela qual uma mulher opta por parir pela segunda vez!)
Confusing experience with the memory of it is a compelling cognitive illusion—and it is the substitution that makes us believe a past experience can be ruined. The experiencing self does not have a voice. The remembering self is sometimes wrong, but it is the one that keeps score and governs what we learn from living, and it is the one that makes decisions. What we learn from the past is to maximize the qualities of our future memories, not necessarily of our future experience. This is the tyranny of the remembering self. …
For an objective observer evaluating the episode from the reports of the experiencing self, what counts is the “area under the curve” that integrates pain over time; it has the nature of a sum. The memory that the remembering self keeps, in contrast, is a representative moment, strongly influenced by the peak and the end. …
[T]ourism is about helping people construct stories and collect memories. The frenetic picture taking of many tourists suggests that storing memories is often an important goal, which shapes both the plans for the vacation and the experience of it. The photographer does not view the scene as a moment to be savored but as a future memory to be designed. Pictures may be useful to the remembering self—though we rarely look at them for very long, or as often as we expected, or even at all—but picture taking is not necessarily the best way for the tourist’s experiencing self to enjoy a view.
For another thought experiment, imagine you face a painful operation during which you will remain conscious. You are told you will scream in pain and beg the surgeon to stop. However, you are promised an amnesia-inducing drug that will completely wipe out any memory of the episode. How do you feel about such a prospect? Here again, my informal observation is that most people are remarkably indifferent to the pains of their experiencing self. Some say they don’t care at all. Others share my feeling, which is that I feel pity for my suffering self but not more than I would feel for a stranger in pain. Odd as it may seem, I am my remembering self, and the experiencing self, who does my living, is like a stranger to me.
* * *
o que é um dia feliz? um dia passado com pessoas que você ama e que te amam.
I proposed that it made sense to say that “Helen was happy in the month of March” if she spent most of her time engaged in activities that she would rather continue than stop, little time in situations she wished to escape, and—very important because life is short—not too much time in a neutral state in which she would not care either way. … [T]he second best predictor of the feelings of a day is whether a person did or did not have contacts with friends or relatives. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that happiness is the experience of spending time with people you love and who love you.
* * *
a falácia do affective forecasting, ou porque achamos que certas coisa vão nos fazer mais felizes do que de fato fazem.
In the useful term introduced by Daniel Gilbert and Timothy Wilson, the decision to get married reflects, for many people, a massive error of affective forecasting. On their wedding day, the bride and the groom know that the rate of divorce is high and that the incidence of marital disappointment is even higher, but they do not believe that these statistics apply to them.
* * *
a receita da tristeza: colocar para si mesma objetivos difíceis de alcançar. tipo viver de arte!
The people who wanted money and got it were significantly more satisfied than average; those who wanted money and didn’t get it were significantly more dissatisfied. The same principle applies to other goals—one recipe for a dissatisfied adulthood is setting goals that are especially difficult to attain. Measured by life satisfaction 20 years later, the least promising goal that a young person could have was “becoming accomplished in a performing art.”
* * *
depois de atingirmos um nível médio de satisfação, mais dinheiro não nos faz mais felizes:
The satiation level beyond which experienced well-being no longer increases was a household income of about $75,000 in high-cost areas (it could be less in areas where the cost of living is lower). The average increase of experienced well-being associated with incomes beyond that level was precisely zero.
* * *
a essência do focusing illusion (em português, ancoragem?): nada na vida é tão importante quanto parece quando você está pensando nela.
This is the essence of the focusing illusion, which can be described in a single sentence: Nothing in life is as important as you think it is when you are thinking about it.
* * *
adaptar-se a uma nova situação, seja ela boa ou má, consiste em não pensar sobre ela. assim, a coisa ruim se torna progressivamente menos ruim, mas também a coisa boa se torna progressivamente menos boa.
a gente se acostuma a tudo.
Adaptation to a new situation, whether good or bad, consists in large part of thinking less and less about it. In that sense, most long-term circumstances of life, including paraplegia and marriage, are part-time states that one inhabits only when one attends to them. …
Consistent with this idea, recent studies of colostomy patients have produced dramatic inconsistencies between the patients’ experienced well-being and their evaluations of their lives. Experience sampling shows no difference in experienced happiness between these patients and a healthy population. Yet colostomy patients would be willing to trade away years of their life for a shorter life without the colostomy. Furthermore, patients whose colostomy has been reversed remember their time in this condition as awful, and they would give up even more of their remaining life not to have to return to it. Here it appears that the remembering self is subject to a massive focusing illusion about the life that the experiencing self endures quite comfortably.
* * *
miswanting: quando a gente quer muito uma coisa, por achar que ela vai nos fazer muito felizes, mas simplesmente não vai.
Daniel Gilbert and Timothy Wilson introduced the word miswanting to describe bad choices that arise from errors of affective forecasting. This word deserves to be in everyday language. The focusing illusion (which Gilbert and Wilson call focalism) is a rich source of miswanting. In particular, it makes us prone to exaggerate the effect of significant purchases or changed circumstances on our future well-being. …
Winning a lottery yields a new state of wealth that will endure for some time, but decision utility corresponds to the anticipated intensity of the reaction to the news that one has won. The withdrawal of attention and other adaptations to the new state are neglected, as only that thin slice of time is considered. The same focus on the transition to the new state and the same neglect of time and adaptation are found in forecasts of the reaction to chronic diseases, and of course in the focusing illusion. The mistake that people make in the focusing illusion involves attention to selected moments and neglect of what happens at other times. The mind is good with stories, but it does not appear to be well designed for the processing of time.
* * *
nossas memórias não sabem interpretar o tempo:
We believe that duration is important, but our memory tells us it is not. The rules that govern the evaluation of the past are poor guides for decision making, because time does matter. The central fact of our existence is that time is the ultimate finite resource, but the remembering self ignores that reality. …
Duration neglect also makes us prone to accept a long period of mild unpleasantness because the end will be better, and it favors giving up an opportunity for a long happy period if it is likely to have a poor ending. To drive the same idea to the point of discomfort, consider the common admonition, “Don’t do it, you will regret it.” The advice sounds wise because anticipated regret is the verdict of the remembering self and we are inclined to accept such judgments as final and conclusive. We should not forget, however, that the perspective of the remembering self is not always correct. An objective observer of the hedonimeter profile, with the interests of the experiencing self in mind, might well offer different advice. The remembering self’s neglect of duration, its exaggerated emphasis on peaks and ends, and its susceptibility to hindsight combine to yield distorted reflections of our actual experience.
* * *
a maneira como articulamos nossas escolhas já é uma escolha:
[T]he framing of the individual’s decision—Thaler and Sunstein call it choice architecture—has a huge effect on the outcome. The nudge is based on sound psychology.
* * *
fausto, de goethe
fausto I, de johann wolfgang goethe, 1806, alemão. (trad: jenny klabin seagall, 1949.) 20-22dez15.
fausto II, de johann wolfgang goethe, 1832, alemão. (trad: jenny klabin seagall, 1967.) 22-26dez15.
faust, parts one and two, de johann wolfgang goethe, 1806-1832, alemão. (trad: george madison priest, 1932)
depois de escrever uma sequência particularmente exaustiva de textos, decidi me dar umas pequenas férias e ler um livro que não tivesse NADA a ver com nenhum trabalho, com nenhum projeto, com nada prático, pelo puro prazer estético.
escolhi o fausto, de goethe. já publiquei meus comentários em separado, nesse texto.
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os monumentos do rio de janeiro – inventário 2015, de vera dias
2015, português. 23dez15.
eu amo o rio de janeiro. e, entre tantas coisas que eu amo no rio de janeiro, uma das que eu mais amo é a enorme quantidade de monumentos públicos.
(segundo a gerente de monumentos e chafarizes da fundação de parques e jardins, e autora do livro, vera dias, são cerca de 1265. todos citados e quase todos fotografados no livro.)
segundo outro dado, que não sei de onde tirei, o rio seria a segunda cidade do mundo em estátuas de ferro ao ar-livre, perdendo somente para paris.
tenho um velho projeto de fazer um livro com brevíssimas crônicas sobre os monumentos públicos do rio e sobre a relação da população com eles. (já publiquei uma amostra aqui.)
com esse livro, meu trabalho fica mais fácil.
obrigado, vera. obrigado a todos na prefeitura que trabalharam para mapear esse incrível inventário. vocês não fazem ideia de como esse seu livro me emocionou.
meu coração de historiador praticante e carioca apaixonado adorou conhecer todas os monumentos da cidade, nome da pessoa artista, data de instalação, etc etc, mas confesso que meu coração de escritor de ficção gostou mais das últimas páginas do livro, com as fotos das estátuas não-identificadas que estão perdidas no depósito da gerência de chafarizes e monumentos.
e fiquei aqui pirando: temos um monumento ao soldado desconhecido, por que não um wikiparque das estátuas desconhecidas? onde poderíamos passear entre os caminhos e deixar a imaginação pirar nas estátuas sem nome? diante de cada estátua, um quadro branco com caneta permitiria que as pessoas cidadãs escrevessem e reescrevessem a história de cada monumento:
esse aqui é o barão hermógenes brandizzi, que inventou o ioiô e morreu de tanto comer patê. esse outro é o comendador joaquim dietrich thompson, vulgo juju chupa-chupa, veterano da guerra do paraguai, sócio-fundador da light e, no final da vida, uma das travestis mais lendárias da lapa. etc etc.
faz falta um parque desses, hein?
* * *
decameron, de boccaccio
decameron, de giovanni boccaccio, 1353, italiano. (trad: ivonne benedetti, 2013.) 29dez15-11jan16. releitura.
decameron, dez novelas selecionadas, de giovanni boccaccio, 1353, italiano. (trad: mauricio santana dias, 2013.)
decameron, vols I e II, de giovanni boccaccio, 1353, italiano. (trad: raul de polillo, 1952, atribuída a torrieri guimarães.)
decameron, de giovanni boccaccio, 1353, italiano. (trad: g. h. mcwilliam, 1972.)
mais um livro delicioso, lido para descansar. as notas completas sobre o decameron já foram publicadas aqui.
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a mesma ressalva de sempre
fazer listas de livros reforça uma ideia que considero muito problemática:
que “ler é bom”, que todas deveríamos “ler mais”, que ler é uma atividade intrinsecamente melhor do que a maioria das outras, etc.
mas ler um livro não é mérito, não é vantagem alguma, não é algo para se gabar.
mais importante, simplesmente ter lido um livro não significa que a pessoa leitora o entendeu, que tirou dele qualquer coisa de relevante, bela, prazeirosa ou útil.
listar os livros que eu li faz tanto sentido quando listar os vagões de metrô que eu viajei. (aliás, quase sempre, o 1022 e o 1026, que operam na linha um e são os últimos vagões de suas composições.)
e daí, não?
apesar disso, incrivelmente, as pessoas pedem e perguntam.
enfim, a verdade é que trabalho com livros. para mim, pessoalmente, esse tipo de lista é relevante e me ajuda a sistematizar as leituras.
então, apesar do efeito negativo de divulgar listas assim, aqui vão alguns dos livros que eu li em setembro e outubro de 2015.
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convenções da lista: título, autor, data da escritura, idioma original. (organizador, tradutor, data da organização e/ou tradução) data da leitura.